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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ARTHUR BIGGS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 940562-CA
vs.
Oral Argument Priority 15
DAVID R. CALVERT,
Defendant-Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from the Final Order of Dismissal
of the Fourth District Court of Utah County, Utah
the Honorable Guy R. Burningham, District Judge
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Plaintiff-Appellant Arthur Biggs submits this Reply Brief to
the brief of Defendant-Appellee David Calvert.

A.

Long-arm
i.

Statute

Contacts

Calvert claims that the exhibits attached to Biggs' complaint
do not help Biggs' claim that the district court had personal
jurisdiction.

Specifically, Calvert quotes language from STV Int' 1

Marketing v. Cannondale Corp., 750 F. Supp. 1070, 1077 (D. Utah
1990):
The nexus requirement is not met whenever there is
creation or breach of a contract with a Utah plaintiff.
Nor would the circumstance of presence in Utah by way of
correspondence and telephone calls, without more,
necessarily be sufficient to satisfy nexus.
Calvert

uses

correspondence

and

this

telephone

including the promissory
(Exhibits 2 and

language

note

to

suggest

calls between
(Exhibit

that

the

frequent

Biggs

and

Calvert,

1) and the

assignments

3) , do not establish Utah's jurisdiction

over

Calvert.
Calvert has omitted

important language from this passage.

Immediately after it the court dropped a footnote in which it
stated,
In Rambo fv. American Southern Insurance Co. , 839
F.2d 1415 (10th Cir. 1988),] the court said: "Certainly,
telephone calls and letters may provide sufficient
contacts for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. . .
. However, the exercise of jurisdiction depends on the
nature
of those contacts." (citations omitted, emphasis
added)

1

STV Int'l, 750 F. Supp. at 1077 n.17.

This footnote demonstrates

that when assessing jurisdiction there are no hard and fast rules
(as Calvert

suggests),

analysis controls.

but

rather

a

"fact

and

circumstances"

The STV Int'l court underscored this point

when, immediately after stating the passage quoted by Calvert, it
decides to rule that a nexus did indeed exist after examining the
"totality of facts."

Id.

There is no escaping the fact that Calvert was doing business
in Utah, and was aware of that fact.

He contracted with Utah

residents, knowing that he would be sending payments to them in
Utah.

He executed assignments and subsequently sent them to Utah.

He did the same with a promissory note.
The nature of such contacts is substantial and not transitory.
This is not a case where one is negotiating a purchase of an item
for use outside the forum

state, or communicating

terms of a

contract to be performed outside the forum state.

Under such

circumstances the nature of the communications would be of the sort
contemplated
communications
substantially

by

the

STV

constitute
in Utah.

Int'l
part

of

court.
a

Rather,

contract

to

be

here

the

performed

Furthermore, the communications do not

operate as some kind of snare to trick Calvert into appearing in
the Utah courts.

Rather, he knew that payments would be sent to

Utah and that he was dealing with Utah residents.

Indeed, at least

one of the documents (Exhibit 4) contained a blank signature line
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for Biggs: Calvert knew that the document would be signed in Utah,
and Calvert ostensibly sent it to Utah primarily for that purpose.
The case Calvert cites, Far West Capital v. Towne, 828 F.
Supp. 909 (D. Utah 1993) , does not change this conclusion.

Calvert

misrepresents the similarity of Far West with the case at bar.

In

Far West the plaintiffs specifically alleged only seven contacts
with Utah, none of which were face to face, and virtually all of
which were facsimile transmission (two of which were followed up by
phone calls).

Id. at 913.

Furthermore, the contract in Far West

was not to be performed in any way in Utah, and was negotiated
primarily in Nevada (where Towne was a resident) and California.
Any Utah contacts
transitory nature.

in Far West were certainly

sparse and of a

They do not match in quantity or quality the

contacts in this case.
ii.

Documents

Calvert contends that the documents that Biggs submitted in
support

of

his

jurisdictional

claim

were

inadmissible.

When

confronted with the fact that no objection was made below to these
documents, he simply responds, without supporting authority, "No
motion to strike was necessary."
response speaks for itself.

Brief of Appellee at 14.

This

It is hornbook law that an evidentiary

objection in waived if a proper objection is not made at the proper
time.
point.

Biggs cited the Franklin Financial case to underscore that
When

Calvert

contends

that

Franklin

Financial

is

inapposite, he is merely displaying his unwillingness to recognize
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that basic principle of evidentiary law.

Calvert strains at a gnat

(Franklin Financial dealt with affidavits), while swallowing a
camel (Franklin Financials point is that one must make evidentiary
objections to preserve them on appeal).
B.

Due

Process

Calvert

correctly

recognizes

that

it

is

important

defendant to anticipate that he will be subject to the

for a
forum

state's jurisdiction, but errs in asserting that he could not
anticipate being brought to court in Utah.

As has been pointed

out, this debt was to be paid to Utahns in Utah, and important
documents concerning the debt were sent by Calvert to the Biggs in
Utah.

This is purposeful availment.
It

is

simplistic

of

Calvert

to

invoke

cases

forbidding

jurisdiction based merely on contracting with residents of the
forum.

This

is not

such

a case.

As noted

above, Far West

concerned a contract between a Nevada resident and a Utah resident,
negotiated in Nevada and California, and to be performed outside of
Utah.
F.2d

Another case cited by Calvert, Nicholas v. Buchanan, 806
305

Islander

(1st Cir. 1986), concerns a contract between a Rhode
(plaintiff) and a Texan

(defendant).

The contract was

solicited by the Rhode Islander, was to be performed in Texas, and
virtually all correspondence concerning the contract originated in
Rhode

Island

and was sent to Texas.

There

is, in short, no

imaginable way to analogize this case to the one at bar.
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Fairness is at the heart of the court's inquiry—that much is
clear•

The numerosity and substance of Calvert's communications

with the Biggs, combined with his knowledge that payment would be
made to the Biggs in Utah, demonstrate that Calvert should have
anticipated suit in Utah.

Furthermore, Calvert will suffer little

inconvenience in having to defend the lawsuit here.

The district

court should be reversed.
DATED this

}y

day of March, 199!
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HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Appellant
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